מצער, גם אם לא מפתיע, התמיכה שזוכה לה חברת הכנסת סתיו שפיר מרבים בציבור בישראל. מסתבר, שבהעדר תקשורת ביקורתית, שרלטנים מתלהמים, שזורקים ססמאות פופוליסטיות, זוכים לאהדה.
מצורף מחדש, הדיון בתקשורת עם שפיר בנושא פיקוח שכר דירה ב”לילה כלכלי,” בו אני טוען שכלכלני ה-OECD לא תומכים בפיקוח שכר דירה שנועד להוריד את השכירות מתחת למחיר השוק התחרותי, בניגוד לטענות של שפיר. אני מבהיר שיש ברשותי אמייל, ובו כותב לי את הדברים במפורש כריסטוף אנדרה, אחד מהכלכלנים ב-OECD ששפיר פגשה (כמובן שכתבתי לו את המייל בעקבות הדיווח המטעה של שפיר לציבור בישראל).
אז מוזמנים לצפות בראיון ולקרוא את המייל ששלח לי כריסטוף (מופיע כאן במלואו כמובן ללא כל עריכה). העובדות די ברורות, סתיו שפיר – אינה אומרת אמת, בניגוד מוחלט לעובדות.
Dear Professor Moav,
Thank you for your mail.
There isn’t a one-size-fits-all OECD position on rent control, nor is there a unit dealing with such matters on a permanent basis. I can just outline my personal thinking (as I have perhaps the most experience among staff members in studying housing markets) and the findings of some OECD studies about these matters. This should neither be interpreted as an OECD official view, nor as a position in the Israeli debate.
A few principles are:
- Rent controls are not a sustainable way to improve affordability. While they may do so in the very short term, they tend to result in a shortage of adequate rental housing in the longer term. Andrews et al. find no clear correlation between rent controls and the level of rents across OECD countries (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/…/housing-markets-and-structur…).
- Excessively tight rent regulation can have serious negative effects not only on the supply of rental housing, but also on the amount of maintenance undertaken by landlords and on household mobility.
- In cases where rental markets are very tight, there is a strong asymmetry of power between landlords and tenants. This may justify relatively soft rental regulation, notably capping increases in rents, which many countries do. A sustainable rental market requires regulation that finds the right balance between the rights of landlords and tenants. This is not only about rent control, but also about security of tenure, minimum dwelling quality norms and arbitration of conflicts.
- The appropriate level of regulation in the rental market depends on the structure of the broader housing market, for example the balance between supply and demand, and the availability of alternatives to private rental for low-income households (e.g. social and cooperative housing). Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have low regulation and relatively efficient rental markets. But the lack of security of tenure limits the development of the rental market. This leads to pressure on home-ownership, with potential sustainability problems for relatively low-income households. Conversely, Germany has relatively soft rent regulation (though it has been tightened recently) and a well-developed private rental market as well as a more stable housing market. The well-functioning rental market contributes to the stability of the broader housing system, although it is not the only factor.
More specifically on your questions:
- Do I understand correctly that the approach today by OECD is to object any regulation that aims at reducing the rent below its market equilibrium? ). I would not say object, but lowering rents below market equilibrium is not seen as a sustainable option in general. The concept of market equilibrium is a bit misleading though, because there are many other distortions from a market price than rent control (e.g. land-use planning, building regulations, taxation,…). In case rents are unaffordable, the aim should be to lower the market equilibrium rent, notably through facilitating an increase in supply.
- Do I understand correctly that the approach today is to restrict increases in rent only to avoid raises that go above the market price (as a result of the asymmetry in costs of ending a contract between owner and tenant)? ). This is the idea. In practice, things are a bit more complicated, because you need a definition of the market price, which is not always straightforward. There can also be issues with rents that are below the market rent and dwellings that have been renovated, for example.
- I understand that, by and large, OECD is supporting some form of regulation (e.g., to prevent raises above market). If this is true, do you know if the benefits of such regulation outweigh the costs in terms of public spending on enforcement and private costs of reporting and so on? This depends on the country. For example, regulation is very light in Finland, but the system is working well and I would not advocate tighter regulation (their system of negotiations between tenants and landlords associations to fix a reasonable benchmark and general adherence to it by landlords is a good substitute for regulation in that particular case). Any meaningful cost-benefit analysis would have to be country-specific and as far as I know has not been done by the OECD for any country. My view is that generally the net cost is likely to be U-shaped, with the highest costs for no regulation and very rigid regulations (e.g. a strict cap on the level of rents).
- Finally, regarding standards for a flat to be rented: do you believe that restrictions regarding size, quality and so on, beyond the general regulations that exist for dwellings, do in fact benefit the renters or the functioning of the rental market? Minimum standards of quality are necessary. In many countries, the real issue is about enforcement. As housing is a basic human right, mechanisms should be in place to support those who cannot access decent housing through the market. However, if such regulations are already in place for owner-occupied dwellings, the same should apply to the rental sector. Trying to go too far in guaranteeing high-quality rental dwellings would no doubt have a perverse effect and harm the poorest renters who would be ultimately squeezed out altogether without heavy public subsidies.
I hope this is useful. I copy my colleagues Claude Giorno and Peter Jarrett, respectively head of the Israel desk in the Economics Department and head of the Country Studies division which includes Israel.
Best regards,
Christophe